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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The \3tah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this "matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 
pertaining to Appeals from District Courts involving domestic 
relations cases. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Was the denial of Defendant/Appellant's Petition for 
Conciliation, filed more than four (4) months after commencement of 
the divorce action, abuse of discretion, amounting to error? 
B. Did the lower Court in exercise of its discretionary 
authority, error by granting Plaintiff a divorce upon the grounds 
of irreconcilable differences, a no-fault provision that does not 
need fault to be proven. 
C. Whether the constitutionality of Section 30-3-1(h), Utah 
Code Annotated, as amended, not raised or argued by Appellant in 
the lower Court and raised for the first time on appeal, is 
properly before the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Standard of Review on this Appeal is an abuse of 
discretion standard. The trial Court has broad discretion in 
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ruling on a Petition for Conciliation. Where the evidence in a 
divorce action, with respect to grounds, is conflicting, but there 
is sufficient evidence to support the lower Court's finding against 
the Defendant, the Appellate Court will approve the lower Court 
finding. Anderson v. Anderson. 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d 252 (1943). 
The Appellate Court should review the factual findings of the 
trial Judge under the "clearly erroneous standard." The trial 
Court's Findings of Fact should not be disturbed unless such 
findings are clearly erroneous. Findings of Fact will be regarded 
as clearly erroneous only if they are "so lacking in support as to 
be against the clear weight of the evidence." Hacren v. Hagen, 810 
P.2d 478 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991); Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1989) . The Appellant must first marshall the 
evidence which supports the finding and then demonstrate that, 
despite this evidence, it is clearly erroneous. Christensen v. 
Munns, 812 P.2d 69,73 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991). 
The constitutionality of 30-3-1(h), Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, is a presumption of validity standard. Lehi City v. 
Meiling, 87 Ut. 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935). The legislative power is 
vested in the Legislature of the State of Utah by virtue of Article 
VI, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. Marriage is a 
relationship that may be created and terminated only with consent 
of the State. 
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CONTROLLING STATUTES 
A. Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-1(h), as amended, which 
provides as a grounds for divorce "irreconcilable differences." 
B. Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-13.1, et. seq., as 
amended, enacted 1969 which provides that a Family Court Division 
of the District Court may be established with consent of the County 
Legislative body and determination by the District Court that 
social conditions in the County and the number of domestic relation 
cases in the Courts require the procedures provided for in this 
Act, (emphasis added) 
C. Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 1, which states the 
legislative power is vested in the Legislature (Senate and House of 
Representatives) of the State of Utah, embodies the power to 
regulate marriage, a relationship that may be created and 
terminated only with the consent of the State. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This an Appeal from a Decree of Divorce granted to the 
Plaintiff by the trial Court, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, upon 
the ground of irreconcilable differences, and denial of Defendant's 
Petition for Conciliation. 
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PROCEEDINGS IN LOWER COURT 
The Plaintiff (wife) filed this divorce action on November 14, 
1995 (R. 1-9), and Summons was first served on Defendant, December 
3, 1995. (R. 34) The Summons and Order to Show Cause for 
Temporary Custody, Support and Other Relief, was served on 
Defendant a second time on December 29, 1995, (R. 38-44) after 
Defendant had filed a Motion to Quash the first service of process. 
(R. 25-29) Defendant filed his Answer to the Complaint on January 
10, 1996 (R. 47-48). 
Hearing on Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause was held on 
February 1, 1996, with an Order entered on the Order to Show Cause, 
March 4, 1996. (R. 71-77) The Guardian Ad Litem appointed by the 
Court to determine the allegations of abuse of the minor children, 
filed her report with the Court on May 20, 1996. (R. 80-86) It 
was her belief that the children were not being neglected or 
abused. However, she determined that the children did not have a 
good relationship with their father (Defendant). 
Certification of Readiness for Trial was filed on March 25, 
1996, (R. 99) after completion of discovery by Plaintiff. 
(R. 49; 68) Defendant, after Notice of the Pre-trial Settlement 
Conference, filed a Petition for Conciliation on April 17, 1996, 
(R. 101-103) although he had not yet attended the Divorce Education 
Course. Defendant's Petition for Conciliation was denied by 
Domestic Relations Commissioner, Lisa A. Jones, at the Pre-trial 
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Settlement Conference. (R. 104; 131) Defendant objected to the 
Commissioner's denial of his Petition for Conciliation. (R. 121-
126) The case having been certified to Judge Sandra N. Peuler, 
for trial, an Order scheduling a Pre-trial/Settlement Conference 
for July 15, 1996 was sent by the Court. (R. 133-134) There 
being no settlement, a trial date of September 6, 1996 was set by 
the Court. (R. 135-136) 
Defendant filed his Notice to Submit for Decision his 
Objection to denial of his Petition for Conciliation on July 30, 
1996 (R. 151-152) The Court, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, 
denied Defendant's Objection by written and signed Minute Entry, 
August 22, 1996 (R. 150-153) and the Order thereon (R. 226-227). 
The case came on for trial, as scheduled, September 6, 1996, 
and was tried. (R. 156-157) Defendant, on the morning of trial, 
filed an untimely handwritten letter with the Court. (R. 159-225; 
T. 284) Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, with the Decree 
of Divorce, was filed on October 22, 1996 and entered by the Court. 
(R. 241-269) . Notice of Entry of Judgment was sent and filed with 
the Court, November 5, 1996. (R. 270-271) A Notice of Appeal was 
filed by Defendant on November 7, 1996. (R. 272-273) 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Court, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, after evidentiary 
hearing, made findings and concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to 
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be granted a Decree of Divorce, upon the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. (R. 242-243; T. 293-303; 504-505) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were married August 4, 1978 at Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and separated August 14, 1995. (T. 292) 
2. Three (3) children were born issue of the marriage and 
Defendant agreed that Plaintiff should be the custodian and awarded 
custody of the children. (R. 2; 47; T. 304-305) 
3. The parties had been experiencing problems and 
difficulties in the marriage for a little over three (3) years 
before Plaintiff filed her Complaint for divorce, that began after 
Defendant lost his job in the fall of 1991. Defendant 
acknowledged that there were problems and difficulties in the 
marriage, which he characterized as the "real problems" for which 
they sought counselling. (T. 376-377; 450-451) 
4. The parties had been engaged in marriage counselling with 
Dr. Victor Cline prior to the time Defendant separated from 
Plaintiff and the minor children. (T. 295-296) Defendant left 
Plaintiff and the children without financial resources or support 
and stayed away for approximately 2 1/2 months. Plaintiff was not 
employed at the time and had not worked out of the home during the 
marriage. Defendant did not send money to support them, which was 
very hard on Plaintiff and the family, physically and emotionally. 
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(T. 298-300) Although the parties had engaged in counselling 
prior to Defendant separating from Plaintiff, they were unable to 
resolve the marital problems and difficulties that continued to the 
time of trial. (T. 353-355; 358-371) 
5. Plaintiff testified to many of the problems she had 
experienced during the marriage to Defendant that could not be 
reconciled. She testified Defendant was controlling, critical of 
her and the children, very domineering, preaching to her which made 
her feel degraded and unworthy, all of which the Court found 
sufficient in terms of grounds for granting the divorce. (T. 294-
303; 504-505) Defendant acknowledged that Plaintiff was unhappy 
in the marriage and had expressed to him that he was domineering, 
controlling and judgmental. (T. 403; 450-452) 
6. Defendant has sought to place the source and blame of the 
parties unresolved problems and difficulties to unnamed others. 
(T. 398; 406; 423) Defendant did not attend the Divorce Education 
class and declined to continue marriage counselling after the 
separation (T. 353-354). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DENIAL OP DEFENDANTS PETITION FOR CONCILIATION 
BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS DISCRETIONARY AND NOT ERROR 
Defendant/Appellant filed his Petition for Conciliation on 
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April 17, 1996, more than four (4) months after commencement of the 
action and after Notice of the Pre-trial Settlement Conference 
before Domestic Relations Commissioner, Lisa A. Jones. (R. 101-103; 
105-106) The Third District Court had not established a Family 
Court Division, nor appointed a Domestic Relations Counselor. (See 
Section 30-3-15.1, U.C.A. Amended) Section 30-3-13.1, Utah Code 
Annotated, as Amended, provides: 
A Family Court Division of the District Court may be 
established with the consent of the County Legislative 
body in a County in which the District Court determines 
that the social conditions in the County and number of 
Domestic Relations cases in the Courts require use of 
the procedures provided for in this Act, in order to 
give full and property consideration to such cases and 
to effectuate the purposes of this Act. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-15.2 of the Family Court Act 
relating to powers of Domestic Relation counselors, had been 
repealed, effective April 27, 1992. Absent the establishment of 
a family Court division by the Third District Court and the 
appointment of a Domestic Relations counselor, denial of 
Defendant's Petition for Conciliation by Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, Lisa A. Jones, and thereafter, Judge Sandra N. 
Peuler, denying Defendant's Objection to the Commissioner's Order, 
was proper, under the circumstances existing and within the 
discretionary authority provided by the Act. Section 30-3-16.7, 
U.C.A. of the Act, provides for a stay of a pending action, when a 
Petition for Conciliation is filed, for a period of sixty (60) 
days, unless the Court otherwise orders. (emphasis added) 
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Assuming the District Court had established a Family Court 
Division, and appointed a Domestic Relations counselor, Section 
30-3-17, U.C.A. of the Act, "POWER AND JURISDICTION OF JUDGE" 
clearly provides discretionary authority to the Court with regard 
to filing a Petition for Conciliation and with respect to 
recommending the aid of a psychiatrist, psychologist or other 
specialist, or a religious representative by use or the word "MAY" 
adding, "the power and jurisdiction granted by this Act shall be in 
addition to that presently exercised by the District Court's and 
shall not be in limitation thereof." (emphasis added) The Court 
of Appeals, in rendering its decision in A.E. v. Crstan, 13 Ut. 
Adv. Rep. 3, at page 5, cited the Utah Supreme Court case of 
Kennecott Copper Corporation v. Salt Lake County. 575 P.2d 705 
(Utah 1978) and acknowledged that the term "shall" may be either 
discretionary or mandatory. It is clear from reading of Section 
30-3-16.7, U.C.A. of the Act, use of the word "shall" is 
discretionary where the District Court is given the authority and 
alternative to, "otherwise order." Use of the word "may" in 
Section 30-3-17, U.C.Ac of the Act, is a clear indication of the 
discretionary authority given to the Court. Where, as here, the 
Third District Court had not established a Family Court Division, 
nor appointed a Domestic Relations counselor, denial of 
Defendant/Appellant's Petition for Conciliation by the District 
Court was proper, under the circumstances, and well within its 
discretionary authority. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT«S FINDING OP IRRECONGILABLE DIFFERENCES 
IS SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
As a general rule, the trial Court is afforded broad 
discretion in domestic relation cases. When the Plaintiff 
presents sufficient, substantial evidence to support grounds for 
divorce, the Court should grant a divorce. Anderson v. Anderson 
(supra) All that is required is that the irreconcilable 
differences exist. Grosskopf v. Grosskopf. 672 P.2d 814 (Wy 1984) 
Defendant's attack on the trial Court's ruling is a challenge 
to the Court's findings of fact. To successfully attack a finding 
of fact, Defendant, as Appellant, must first marshall all the 
evidence supporting the finding and then demonstrate that even if 
viewed in the light most favorable to the trial Court, the evidence 
is legally insufficient to support the finding. Christensen v. 
Munns (supra); Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Ut. 1989) 
Legal sufficiency of the evidence is determined under Rule 
52(a) U.R.C.P., which provides: 
"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence shall not be set aside 
unless "clearly erroneous" and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial Court 
to judge the creditability of the witnesses." 
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Richens v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co. 817 P.2d 382 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1991); Doelle v. Bradley (supra). The finding of the trial Court 
and its conclusion that irreconcilable differences existed between 
the parties is supported by the trial transcript of Plaintiff's 
testimony and that of Defendant. During the marriage the 
Defendant was controlling, emotionally abusive, critical of her, 
being judgmental, preaching to her, causing her to feel unworthy. 
(T. 294-295) Defendant separated, voluntarily, from her and the 
family in August, 1995, while the parties were engaged in marriage 
counselling, staying away 2 1/2 months. (T. 296) At the time 
Defendant separated, there was $5.00 in the checking account and 
Plaintiff was not employed, she not having worked outside of the 
home during the marriage. Defendant did not send money for 
support of the family. She supported the family by holding a yard 
sell and working two (2) jobs which was very hard physically and 
emotionally. (T. 298-299) Defendant disapproved of her working 
outside the home, stating by letter sent to her that she was 
"condemned." (T* 300) Plaintiff's desire to continue working and 
Defendant's disapproval of her working, continued and still existed 
at the time of trial. (T. 301; 469) There were financial 
differences that persisted throughout the marriage. (T. 301; 365; 
376; 381) The trial Court, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, found 
from all of the testimony and evidence presented, Plaintiff had set 
forth sufficient basis for a divorce to be granted on the grounds 
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of irreconcilable differences. That the differences included her 
objection to Defendant's treatment of the children, his being 
critical of her, preaching to her, and disagreement over how 
finances were handled* That the parties have disagreed on how 
they should live their lives. Although the Defendant 
characterizes the differences that existed to be minor, and 
believes that the marriage can be reconciled, it takes two to make 
that commitment. The Court found that Plaintiff had concluded 
that their differences are so great that no reasonable effort would 
reconcile them. (T. 504-505). 
Defendant/Appellant has not marshalled the evidence in support 
of the trial Court's findings or demonstrated that the evidence 
supporting the findings is legally insufficient. Although 
Defendant provided conflicting testimony, a trial Court's factual 
finding is deemed "clearly erroneous" only if it is against the 
clear weight of the evidence. Doelle v. Bradley, (supra). The 
challenged finding of irreconcilable differences is not "clearly 
erroneous" and therefore no abuse of discretion on the part of the 
trial Court and its finding and ruling of irreconcilable 
differences should not be disturbed. 
POINT III 
DEPENDANT/APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT SECTION 30-3-1(3)(h) 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED# AS AMENDED, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
IS WITHOUT MERIT 
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The issue of the constitutionality of Section 30-3-1(3)(h), 
U.C.A. was not plead or raised by Defendant at trial. To preserve 
an issue for Appeal, a party must timely bring the issue to the 
attention of the trial Court, thus providing the Court an 
opportunity to rule on the issue's merits. Lebaron & Associates v. 
NEC Information Systems, 823 P.2d 479 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991) Turtle 
Management. Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 
(Ut. 1982). Issues not raised in the trial Court in timely 
fashion are deemed waived, precluding the Appellate Court from 
considering their merits on Appeal. Salt Lake County v. Carlston. 
776 P.2d 653, 655 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). 
The authority and power to regulate marriage and divorce is 
with the State. The only grounds for divorce are those specified 
by statute. Statutes providing for dissolution of marriage on 
grounds of irreconcilable differences, have been held to be valid. 
Defendant/Appellant has not provided legal authority to support his 
position that Section 30-3-1(3)(h), U.C.A. is unconstitutional. In 
fact, the Addendum attached to Defendant/Appellant's Brief at R. 
175 states: 
The validity of marriage dissolution statutes of this 
nature (irreconcilable differences) has been attacked 
in several instances on such grounds as improper 
delegation of the legislative power, denial of due 
process of law, impairment of the obligation of 
contract and unconstitutional vagueness of statutory 
language, but no dissolution of marriage act of 
the type here under consideration has been held 
invalid as of this writing (emphasis added) 
Citing 21 ALR 2d 267 and 58 ALR 2d 1218 
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Defendant acknowledges this quote from his Addendum in his Brief at 
page 29. It appears from his Brief that he basis his claim of 
unconstitutionality in part on religious grounds. Defendant had 
his day in Court and was afforded the due process guaranteed by the 
Utah Constitution. The Court, hearing all of the testimony 
presented and in a position to judge the creditability of the 
witnesses, determined that sufficient, substantial evidence had 
been presented to support granting Plaintiff a Decree of Divorce on 
the grounds of irreconcilable differences. (T. 504-505) 
Defendant's Appeal on this issue should fail and be rejected by the 
Court of Appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing abuse of 
discretion by a clear preponderance under the clearly erroneous 
standard. The finding and ruling of the trial Court of 
irreconcilable differences is supported by substantial, legally 
sufficient evidence. The denial of the Defendant's Petition for 
Conciliation by the District Court was proper, under the 
circumstances, and within its discretionary authority. Absent 
abuse of discretion, there is no error. Defendant/Appellant, 
having failed to plead or raise the constitutionality of Section 
30-3-1(3) (h) , Utah Code Annotated, is deemed waived, precluding the 
Appellate Court from considering this issue on its merits. The 
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authority and power of the State to regulate marriage and divorce 
is not in dispute. The statutes providing for dissolution of 
marriage on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, have been 
held to be valid. 
As a matter of law, Plaintiff having been awarded attorney's 
fees in the lower Court, should be awarded attorney's fees for this 
Appeal. Defendant's Appeal of the lower Court's ruling and 
decision should be denied in all particulars. 
Respectfully submitted this day of June, 1997. 
:#^D 
iTPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSEI 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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